Part 2: Simple international rights, global constitutionalism, and scholarly methods: The rejoinder to comments on "Beyond Human Rights" continued by Peters, Anne
  Navigation 
ANNE PETERS —  3 February, 2016 
Print  0    
DEBATING "BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS" SYMPOSIUM
Part 2: Simple 
international rights, global 
constitutionalism, and 
scholarly methods
The rejoinder to comments on “Beyond Human 
Rights” continued

Seite 1 von 14Part 2: Simple international rights, global constitutionalism, and scholarly methods | ...
10.11.2017https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/part-2-simple-international-rights-global-constitutionalis...
This post continues Anne Peters rejoinder
Roland Portmann’s main point is that national (domestic) law 
principles and practices matters crucially for the legal status 
of the individual, and that we must study closely the 
“interface of domestic constitutional law and international 
law.” He also highlights the importance of domestic law on 
the incorporation of international (treaty) law.
Portmann is right in pointing out that direct effect is crucial. 
I would like to repeat at this point my (controversial) claim 
that direct effect is governed both by international law and 
by the domestic law in question. According to a traditional 
view, direct effect was solely a question of domestic law, the 
answer to which was entirely left to the domestic courts. 
The reasoning for that view was that the issue was primarily 
one of implementing international law or of fulfilling 
international legal obligations. International law itself 
demanded only that it be implemented, but it left the way in 
which it was implemented to the States. The way in which it 
was implemented fell within the domaine réservé and thus – 
from this perspective – also the decision on direct or merely 
indirect effect. In contrast, direct effect can and should 
primarily be understood as a question of interpretation of 
the treaty provision concerned. The decision on direct effect 
depends crucially on criteria relating to the content of the 
norm, and thus inevitably requires interpreting those 
criteria. The interpretation of an international treaty must 
meet international requirements, even if the interpretation 
is made by a domestic court. The rules for interpreting 
international treaties are codified in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties and have been further specified by 
international (and domestic) case law.
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Of course, determining whether an international norm is 
self-executing is normally in the responsibility of the 
domestic authorities and courts called upon in the specific 
dispute. This situation corresponds to the normal case of 
international (decentralized) application of the law. The 
existence of centralized international requirements cannot 
guarantee that they are actually applied identically in 
concrete individual cases.
But because direct effect is a question whose answer – at 
least also – must be found in international law itself, the 
question may also be decided by international courts, as was 
the case in the PCIJ’s Danzig opinion. The crucial argument 
is now that, because both levels are linked to each other as 
reciprocal catch-all mechanisms (“wechselseitige 
Auffangordnungen”, to borrow Hofmann-Riehm and 
Schmidt-Aßmann’s felicitous phrase), notably linked due to 
the local remedies requirement and the principle of 
subsidiarity, the application of an international legal norm by 
domestic and international bodies should follow rules that 
are in turn compatible with each other. If they remain 
disjunct and incompatible, the whole architecture will be 
undermined – and this would run contrary to the telos of the 
mentioned principles of local remedies and subsidiarity and 
thus create an inner contradiction within international law 
itself.
One further important point on direct effect: To argue that it 
is imperative to grant a political leeway to the genuinely 
political bodies of the State, which may then decide whether 
they in fact want to comply with a treaty (e.g. the GATT) or 
the judgment of an international court – or not (by denying 
direct effect), implies a downgrading of the legal-ness of 
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international law. A rule which is not meant to be complied 
with resembles more a political guideline than a legal norm.
Under the premise that international treaties constitute 
genuine law, their violation must – from the perspective of 
the rule of law – be actionable in principle (as a rule), i.e. in 
domestic courts. Such a standpoint is not inevitably naïve in 
the sense that it disregards the political implications of the 
legal analysis but simply insists that law cannot be 
completely dissolved into or reduced to politics. From that 
perspective, we may admit that beyond these arguments lies 
the reality of power, as Hélène Ruiz Fabri has written 
(elsewhere). However, we can not admit that “all depends on 
the ability to resist and bargain over implementation”. To the 
contrary, under the rule of law, not “all” depends on power 
only. From that perspective, exceptions from applicability 
must be specially justified. A general reference to the lower 
level of legitimacy of international law in principle is no 
convincing argument against the normal case of application 
postulated here.
Investor rights in twilight: Evelyne Lagrange
In her blog on my chapter 10 on investor rights and 
obligations, Evelyne Lagrange rightly points out that I left 
some controversial issues in “enduring twilight”. In my 
English revisions I tried to illuminate those a bit more.
I now espouse Moshe Hirsch’s insight that human rights law 
and investment law “have evolved along radically divergent 
paths”. Although the new BITs negotiated or already 
concluded by the EU formulate a novel type of fair and 
equitable treatment standard which in part resemble 
guarantees of procedural human rights (denial of justice and 
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due process), and human rights to non-discrimination, the 
differences between human rights and investor rights prevail 
over their similarities.
Investor rights are not accorded to the investors for the sake 
of human flourishing. They are mainly instrumental, an 
incitement for the exportation of capital which is supposed 
to generate welfare effects in the host State. Second, 
enforceable investor rights are incumbent only to few and 
extremely wealthy entities (often moral and not natural 
persons) who are affluent enough to institute an extremely 
costly investment arbitration proceeding. The two types of 
rights thus have a different telos, and arguably have a 
different weight, too.
Evelyne Lagrange herself highlights an important third 
difference: International human rights are primarily 
protected by domestic courts (sometimes placed under the 
control of an international body) and thereby 
“domesticated”, whereas the investor rights are safeguarded 
by international arbiters only, and thereby completely 
denationalized (see also Evelyne Lagrange, L ’application des 
accords à l’ investissement dans les ordres juridiques 
internes, in : Sabrina Cuendet (ed.), Le droit des 
investissements étrangers : approche globale (Paris : Larcier 
2016)).
Lagrange in that work also demonstrates that substantive 
investor rights flowing from investment treaties are from a 
legal-technical perspective the proper conceptualization, 
but that political considerations by the tribunals motivate 
their denial. What really matters is the lacking invocability of 
those rights in domestic courts. A more ready acceptance of 
the direct effect of investment treaties and the re-
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introduction of domestic remedies in the host State (against 
what is foreseen in Art. 26 ICSID-Convention as the regular 
course) would remedy the normative problem of a 
potentially undue “gouvernement des arbitres” which is 
tainted by legitimacy problems and therefore currently 
regarded with scepticism.
The acknowledgment of substantive (not merely procedural) 
investor individual rights – even short of human rights – 
makes a difference to the mere objective protection of 
investors by international law. By relying on rights, investors 
are emancipated from their home States, are protected from 
too burdensome interpretive statements, enjoy protection 
during the survival period in the event of denunciation and 
termination of an investment protection agreement, and 
ultimately are immunized to a certain extent against 
countermeasures by the host States.
Finally, we should remember that the normal legal situation 
will be the co-existence of State rights and investor rights 
flowing from a given investment treaty. Follow-up questions 
are then the relationship among these two sets of rights and 
the procedural consequences of such a co-existence. In the 
ICSID-system, the investor claim enjoys a procedural 
priority: Art. 27(1) ICSID prohibits the investor’s home State 
to institute any proceedings once the investor is involved in 
an ICSID arbitration.
Obligations of individuals and the principle of legality: 
Raphael Oidtmann
Raphael Oidtmann’s contribution focuses on individual 
obligations. This field is among the most complicated in 
which the law as it stands (and the debate) is somewhat 
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chaotic, mainly because of its focus on criminal 
responsibility and the often lacking distinction between the 
level of primary and secondary obligations. I would however 
not side with Oidtmann that the ability to bear legal 
obligations is an “indispensable” corollary of the capacity to 
bear rights, “already for a logical reason”. On the contrary, it 
is perfectly possible to allow for rights without obligations, 
as domestic law foresees, e.g. for infants.
In Beyond Human Rights, I have sought to show that current 
international law imposes obligations on individuals in 
numerous sub-domains, to an extent Jacob Katz Cogan 
referred to as the regulatory turn in international law. 
Alongside these obligations, however, the normal 
international legal regulatory scheme − merely indirect 
imposition of obligations on individuals by way of the 
international obligations of States to enact national precepts 
and prohibitions, which in turn are addressed to private 
actors − persists and even prevails.
In light of the comprehensive and gapless responsibility of 
States, are parallel prohibitions and precepts directly 
addressed to individuals needed? Additionally, there is the 
danger that States might weasel out of their regulatory 
obligations by referring to the international imposition of 
obligations on individuals. There are also the practical 
difficulties of imposing obligations on 7 billion actors. And 
finally, direct international individual obligations raise 
specific problems of legitimation. For all these reasons, 
international law should not be viewed as a substitute for 
domestic criminal or civil law. Still, no reason exists in the 
nature and structure of international law that would prevent 
it from addressing individuals and imposing legal obligations 
on them.
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But the imposition of obligations on individuals must be 
specially justified separately. And because the obligations 
imposed on individuals are not generated by other private 
persons – against whom private autonomy would have to be 
taken into account – but rather by a public authority, the 
pacta tertiis principle is not useful in this context. 
Nevertheless, the basic concern of the pacta tertiis rule, 
namely to secure the freedom and consent of those on 
whom rights are imposed, remains relevant. The legal 
requirements for imposing international precepts and 
prohibitions on individuals can be found in the reservoir of 
public law and global constitutionalism. I have submitted 
that the development of further individual obligations 
directly under international law should be recognized only 
under two conditions: There must in fact be a need for 
global regulation in that regard, and the principle of legality 
must be respected. In situations where these conditions are 
properly met, individual obligations may be established 
through treaties, customary international law, general 
principles of law, case law, and even secondary international 
law.
A transnationalized principle of legality
The principle of legality originates from the national (public) 
law of liberal constitutional States, and is now a general 
principle of law as referred to in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ 
Statute and hence also an international legal norm. This 
principle (as in national law) serves a dual protective 
purpose, which is slightly modified at the level of 
international law. In national law, the principle of legality 
secures the legitimation of limitations of freedom, firstly in 
terms of the rule of law and secondly in terms of democracy.
Seite 8 von 14Part 2: Simple international rights, global constitutionalism, and scholarly methods | ...
10.11.2017https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/part-2-simple-international-rights-global-constitutionalis...
Within the scope of international law, preventing 
concentration of power is likewise a concern. The 
international principle of legality is – just as in national law – 
an element of the rule of law. As in the national domain, the 
purpose of the rule of international law is to secure freedom, 
namely by stabilizing expectations. Securing freedom 
through the distribution of power within the multi-level 
system of international and national law is achieved less 
through the “horizontal” separation of powers than through 
a “vertical” separation between international bodies for the 
enforcement of individual obligations (such as through 
monitoring bodies, compliance committees, and the like) 
and national authorities.
The second, democratic concern of the principle of legality 
can be taken into account in a limited way in international 
law, although international legal norms generally enjoy less 
democratic legitimation than national laws. A key demand of 
legitimacy which international law must fulfil, however, is 
that international actors be accountable. This principle has a 
similar containing function as the democratic principle, and 
therefore one of the well-known rationales of the principle 
of legality (namely to secure accountability) plays in 
international law, too. The democratic legitimacy deficit 
inherent in an international legal basis constitutes a 
handicap that must be compensated through enhanced 
requirements on specificity and, accordingly, foreseeability 
of the norm purporting to impose obligations on individuals.
Human rights obligations on business?
Based on these considerations it may seem warranted to 
make individual rights – and especially human rights – 
directly binding on enterprises under international law. In 
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the age of globalization, gaps in protection actually do exist 
at the level of national law, so that there is a specific and 
increased risk of under-regulation of the protection of 
workers’ rights, conceived as global goods (so my first 
requirement is met).
On the other hand, it is relevant that the private persons in 
turn are also holders of basic rights. An international 
regulation of the enterprise should not amount to an 
inhibiting restriction of entrepreneurial freedoms that are in 
turn protected by fundamental rights (economic freedom 
and property rights). Moreover, the danger exists in the 
economic context that States might shirk their 
responsibility. If reformed international human rights bodies 
were to deal with human rights violations by enterprises as 
well, some States would presumably seize the opportunity to 
divert attention away from themselves.
All things considered, expanding the binding nature of 
human rights into the sphere of transnational business is 
neither normatively desirable without reservations, nor does 
it have good prospects as a practical matter. It would be 
more promising, and more tailored to the qualitative 
difference between States and enterprises, to strengthen 
only the indirect imposition of the obligation to respect 
human rights on enterprises by intensifying the duties of the 
State to protect, as demanded by the Ruggie Principles. So 
far, States are bound to discharge their duty to protect 
through national action plans which aim to translate the UN 
Principles into practical action at national level. The ongoing 
UN Working Group has issued a “Guidance” which provides 
recommendations on the development, implementation and 
update of these plans. For the EU, the European Commission 
has requested that EU Member States develop plans; and 
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some Member States have already done so. If this mediating 
scheme which is now being slowly and gradually established, 
turns out not to generate sufficient protection, the 
imposition of direct human rights obligations of business 
actors, through a new international treaty, respecting the 
principle of legality, is warranted.
Socializing States through rights beyond human rights
Returning to my initial reflection on scholarly “registers”, I 
conclude that international legal scholarship should be 
adapted to the novel period of international law we are living 
though, a period which is characterised by a high tension 
between interdependence and globalisation (economic, 
technical, and cultural) on the one hand, and stark cleavages 
and fencing (ideational, economic, territorial) among States, 
on the other hand.
In this period, the normative demands on the States should 
not be overstretched by overlegalizing the international 
rights of individuals, because of the ever-present threat of a 
backlash. The reason lies in the sociological truism that law 
which is too “strict” and too clearly contrary to interests of 
those subjected to the law will provoke backlashes that 
undermine the normative force of the law in general.
On the other hand, law – if it is to deserve its name − is 
counterfactual. It is not and should not simply reflect the 
actually existing power relationships and interests. Rather, 
the purpose of every legal norm is to influence the interests 
and conduct of those subject to that norm and to guide them 
in the direction desired by the law-makers. Then, law, 
including international law, itself has a reality-shaping 
significance. Put differently, social reality, including 
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international relations, is constituted in part by law and 
especially by rights. This interaction has been theorized and 
empirically demonstrated by the constructivist strands of 
political science. States can be “socialized” by international 
legal norms under certain conditions. More specifically even, 
changes to the international system have been often or even 
mainly brought about through the struggles of individuals 
for human rights and their predecessor, religious tolerance, 
as Christian Reus-Smit has recently demonstrated. 
Historical examples are the emergence of the Westphalian 
system of States, the independence of Latin American States, 
the reorganization of Europe after the First World War, and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Although this constructive power of law − and of legal rights 
of the individual in particular − is precarious, an anticipatory 
resignation of legal scholars in light of political resistance 
would mean to give up exploiting the factual power of 
normativity and would betray the counterfactual nature of 
law and of rights. It is, I submit, the job of international 
scholars, as professionals, to develop ideas − ideas which 
may have the power of transforming international relations, 
and which therefore contribute to “realizing utopia” (Antonio 
Cassese). As Victor Hugo, to whom Cassese refers, wrote : 
« On résiste à l’invasion des armées; on ne résiste pas à 
l’invasion des idées ».
Anne Peters is Co-Director of The Max Planck Institute for 
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